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Summary
The practice of “authorized generics” has recently been the subject of
considerable attention by the pharmaceutical industry, regulators, and members of
Congress alike.  An “authorized generic”–sometimes termed a “branded,” “flanking,”
or “pseudo” generic–is a pharmaceutical that is marketed by or on behalf of a brand-
name drug company, but is sold under a generic name.  Although the availability of
an additional competitor in the generic drug market would appear to be favorable to
consumers, authorized generics have nonetheless proven controversial.  Some
observers believe that authorized generics potentially discourage independent generic
firms both from challenging drug patents and from selling their own products.
These perceived disincentives result from the provisions of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.  Better known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act, this legislation provides independent generic firms with a reward for
challenging patents held by brand-name firms.  That “bounty” consists of a 180-day
generic drug exclusivity period awarded to the first patent challenger.  During the
180-day period, the brand-name company and the first generic applicant are the only
firms that receive authorization to sell that pharmaceutical.  At the close of this
period, other independent generic competitors may obtain marketing approval and
enter the market, ordinarily resulting in lower prices for generic medicines.
Some commentators view the 180-day exclusivity period as a crucial incentive
for generic firms to challenge patents held by brand-name firms.  Under this view,
the launch of an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period makes the
recovery of litigation expenses more difficult.  In turn, the possibility that a brand-
name firm will sell an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period may
decrease the incentives of generic firms to challenge patents in the first instance. 
Other observers believe that authorized generics benefit consumers by
increasing competition in the generic market.  Because the authorized generic is
manufactured by the brand-name firm and identical to its own product, consumers
may be encouraged to switch to the lower-cost authorized generic alternative.
Authorized generics may also facilitate the settlement of patent litigation between
brand-name and independent generic firms.  As an historical matter, certain of these
settlement agreements have allowed authorized generics to enter the market, and
therefore promoted competition, prior to the expiration of the relevant patent term.
Recent judicial opinions have upheld FDA practices allowing authorized
generics.  As a result of congressional interest, however, the Federal Trade
Commission has agreed to release a report directed towards this issue.  Although
Congress may wish to take no action if the current allowance of authorized generics
is deemed appropriate, other possibilities include subjecting them to the 180-day
generic exclusivity period enjoyed by an independent generic firm, or simply
disallowing them altogether.
This report will be updated as needed.
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Authorized Generic Pharmaceuticals:
Effects on Innovation
Rising health care costs have for many years focused congressional attention
upon the development and availability of prescription drugs.  Recently, the presence
of “authorized generic” pharmaceuticals in the drug marketplace has been the subject
of congressional concern.1  An “authorized generic” is a pharmaceutical that is
marketed by or on behalf of a brand-named drug company, but is sold under a generic
name.  The brand-name firm may distribute the drug under its own auspices or via
a license to a generic drug company.  The price of this “authorized copy” is ordinarily
lower than that of the brand-name drug.2  Some sources refer to authorized generics
as “branded,”“flanking,” or “pseudo” generics.”3
Authorized generics may be pro-consumer in that they potentially increase
competition and lower prices, particularly in the short-term.  They have nonetheless
proven controversial.  Authorized generics ordinarily enter the market at about the
time the brand-name drug company’s patents are set to expire.4  Some observers
argue that such products may possibly discourage independent generic firms both
from challenging drug patents and from selling their own generic products.5  The
potential diminution in independent generic incentives may in turn lead to less desire
on the part of brand-name firms to market authorized generics themselves. 
This report presents an analysis of the innovation and public health issues
relating to authorized generic drugs.  The report begins with a review of the
procedures through which independent generic drug companies receive government
permission to market their products and resolve patent disputes with brand-name
firms.  It then provides detailed background information pertaining to the concept of
authorized generics and assesses their potential impact upon patent challenges and
consumer welfare.  The report closes with a summary of congressional issues and
possible alternatives.
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Marketing Approval and Patent Issues for Generic
Drugs
The practice of authorized generics has arisen within a complex statutory
framework established by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984,6 legislation more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.7  Under
parameters established by that statute, a manufacturer that wishes to sell a generic
drug must both obtain marketing approval from the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and account for any patent rights that pertain to that product.  This report first
addresses FDA marketing approval procedures for generic drugs, and then turns to
possible patent implications.
FDA Approval Procedures
The FDA regulates the marketing of pharmaceuticals in the interest of public
health.8  Under this regime, the developer of a new drug must demonstrate that the
product is safe and effective before it can be distributed to the public.  This showing
typically requires the drug’s sponsor to conduct both preclinical and clinical
investigations.9  In deciding whether to issue marketing approval or not, the FDA
evaluates the test data that the sponsor submits in a so-called New Drug Application
(NDA).
Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the federal food and drug law
contained no separate provisions addressing marketing approval for independent
generic versions of drugs that had previously been approved by the FDA.10  The
result was that a would-be independent  generic drug manufacturer had to file its own
NDA in order to sell its product.11  Some independent generic manufacturers could
rely on published scientific literature demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the
drug by submitting a so-called paper NDA.  Because these sorts of studies were not
available for all drugs, however, not all independent generic firms could file a paper
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NDA.12  Further, at times the FDA requested additional studies to address safety and
efficacy questions that arose from experience with the drug following its initial
approval.13  The result was that some independent generic manufacturers were forced
to prove once more that a particular drug was safe and effective, even though their
products were chemically identical to those of previously approved pharmaceuticals.
Some commentators believed that the approval of an independent generic drug
was a needlessly costly, duplicative, and time-consuming process.14  These observers
noted that although patents on important drugs had expired, manufacturers were not
moving to introduce independent generic equivalents for these products due to the
level of resource expenditure required to obtain FDA marketing approval.15 
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, a
statute that has been described as a “complex and multifaceted compromise between
innovative and generic pharmaceutical companies.”16  Its provisions included the
creation of two statutory pathways that expedited the marketing approval process for
independent generic drugs.  The first of these consist of Abbreviated New Drug
Applications, or ANDAs.  An ANDA allows an independent generic applicant to
obtain marketing approval by demonstrating that the proposed product is
bioequivalent to an approved pioneer drug, without providing evidence of safety and
effectiveness from clinical data or from the scientific literature.   The second are so-
called § 505(b)(2) applications, which are sometimes still referred to as “paper
NDAs.”  Like an NDA, a § 505(b)(2) application contains a full report of
investigations of safety and effectiveness of the proposed product.   In contrast to an
NDA, however, a § 505(b)(2) application typically relies at least in part upon
published literature providing pre-clinical or clinical data.
The availability of ANDAs and § 505(b)(2) applications often allow an
independent generic manufacturer to avoid the costs and delays associated with filing
a full-fledged NDA.  They may also allow an independent generic manufacturer, in
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many cases, to place its FDA-approved bioequivalent drug on the market as soon as
any relevant patents expire.17
As part of the balance struck between brand-name and independent generic
firms, Congress also provided patent proprietors with a means for restoring a portion
of the patent term that had been lost while awaiting FDA approval.  The maximum
extension period is capped at a five-year extension period, or a total effective patent
term after the extension of not more than 14 years.18  The scope of rights during the
period of extension is generally limited to the use approved for the product that
subjected it to regulatory delay.19  This period of patent term extension is intended
to compensate brand-name firms for the generic drug industry’s reliance upon the
proprietary pre-clinical and clinical data they have generated, most often at
considerable expense to themselves.20
Resolution of Patent Disputes
In addition to being the holder of an FDA-approved NDA, the brand-name
pharmaceutical firm may own one or more patents directed towards that drug
product.21  The product described by an independent generic firm’s ANDA or §
505(b)(2) application may possibly infringe those patents should that product be
approved by the FDA and sold in the marketplace.  The Hatch-Waxman Act therefore
establishes special procedures for resolving patent disputes in connection with
applications for marketing generic drugs.
In particular, the Hatch-Waxman Act requires each holder of an approved NDA
to identify patents it believes would be infringed if a generic drug were marketed
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before the expiration of these patents.22  The FDA then lists these patents in a
publication titled Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, which is more commonly known as the “Orange Book.”23  Would-be
manufacturers of independent generic drugs must then engage in a specialized
certification procedure with respect to Orange Book-listed patents.  An ANDA or §
505(b)(2) applicant must state its views with respect to each Orange Book-listed
patent associated with the drug it seeks to market.  Four possibilities exist: 
(1) that the brand-name firm has not filed any patent information with respect to
that drug; 
(2) that the patent has already expired; 
(3) that the generic company agrees not to market until the date on which the
patent will expire; or 
(4) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use or
sale of the drug for which the ANDA is submitted.24
These certifications are respectively termed paragraph I, II, III, and IV certifications.25
An ANDA or § 505(b)(2) application certified under paragraphs I or II is approved
immediately after meeting all applicable regulatory and scientific requirements.26  An
independent generic firm that files an ANDA or § 505(b)(2) application including a
paragraph III certification must, even after meeting pertinent regulatory and scientific
requirements, wait for approval until the drug's listed patent expires.27  
The filing of an ANDA or § 505(b)(2) application with a paragraph IV
certification constitutes a “somewhat artificial” act of patent infringement under the
Hatch-Waxman Act.28  The act requires the independent generic applicant to notify
the proprietor of the patents that are the subject of a paragraph IV certification.29  The
patent owner may then commence patent infringement litigation against that
applicant. 
If the NDA holder demonstrates that the independent generic firm’s proposed
product would violate its patents, then the court will ordinarily issue an injunction
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that prevents the generic drug company from marketing that product.  That injunction
will expire on the same date as the NDA holder’s patents.  Independent generic drug
companies commonly amend their ANDAs or § 505(b)(2) applications in this event,
replacing their paragraph IV certifications with paragraph III certifications.30
On the other hand, the courts may decide in favor of the independent generic
firm.  The court may conclude that the generic firm’s proposed product does not
infringe the asserted patents, or that the asserted patents are invalid or
unenforceable.31  In this circumstance, the independent generic firm may launch its
product once the FDA has approved its ANDA or § 505(b)(2) application.  In
addition, the independent generic firm may benefit from a 180-day period of
marketing exclusivity, a concept this report describes next.
Generic Marketing Exclusivity
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides prospective manufacturers of independent
generic pharmaceuticals with a reward for challenging the patent associated with an
approved pharmaceutical. The reward consists of a 180-day generic drug exclusivity
period awarded to the first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV certification.
During this 180-day period, the FDA may not approve another ANDA containing a
paragraph IV certification with respect to the same drug.32  Notably, the 180-day
generic drug exclusivity applies only to ANDA applicants, and not to those filing §
505(b)(2) applications.33
Commentators have long referred to this provision as creating “generic
exclusivity” or “180-day exclusivity.”34  As originally enacted, the Hatch-Waxman
Act allowed the brand-name firm and the first independent generic applicant to share
the market for the first 180 days of generic competition.  At the close of this period,
other independent generic competitors could receive FDA marketing approval.
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Because market prices often drop considerably following the entry of additional
generic competition, the first independent generic applicant could potentially obtain
more handsome profits than subsequent market entrants.35 
Congressional enactment of the Medicare Modernization and Improvement Act
of 200336 clarified that more than one patent challenger can enjoy “generic
exclusivity,” provided that certain conditions are met.  Following the 2003 statute,
all “first applicants” are potentially entitled to the 180-day generic exclusivity.37  The
statute defines the term “first applicant” to mean all applicants who, on the first day
on which a substantially complete generic application with paragraph IV certification
is filed, did themselves file a substantially complete generic application with a
paragraph IV certification.38  The statute therefore makes clear that multiple first
applicants – that is to say, more than one generic that filed a paragraph IV generic
application on the same day – may each enjoy “shared exclusivity.”
The 180-day generic exclusivity period is intended to ameliorate collective
action problems that may arise with regard to pharmaceutical patent challenges.39
Stated less technically, an independent generic firm that challenges a patent must
bear the expensive, up-front cost of litigation.  If the independent generic firm is
successful, however, the challenged patent is declared invalid with regard to the
entire pharmaceutical industry.  Any firm – not just the one who challenged the
patent – could then introduce a competing product to the marketplace.
Understandably, this forced sharing may undermine the incentives any one
independent generic firm would possess to challenge a brand-name firm’s patent.
The award of 180 days of generic exclusivity is therefore intended to allow a
successful patent challenger to capture an individual benefit for its effort, in turn
encouraging such challenges in the first instance.40
The Concept of Authorized Generics
Authorized Generics Practice
As noted previously, an “authorized generic” is a pharmaceutical that is
marketed by or on behalf of a brand-name drug company, but is sold under a generic
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name.41  Authorized generics are thus similar to “private label” products, which are
manufactured by one firm but sold under the brand of another.  Although private
label products are commonplace in food, cosmetic, and other markets, they have only
recently attracted attention in the pharmaceutical industry.42
Current interest in authorized generics is largely due to a shift in corporate
strategies that has been traced to the early 1990's.  Until that time, many entrants in
the pharmaceutical industry engaged exclusively either in selling brand-name,
innovative drugs, or in selling generic drugs.  Several other brand-name firms began
to market authorized generics shortly before patents on their products were due to
expire.  Among such products were Nolvadex® (tamoxifen), authorized by the
Stewart Pharmaceutical Division of ICI Americas (now AstraZeneca) and sold by
Barr Laboratories; Dyazide® (triamterene/hydrochlorothiazide), marketed by
SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (now GlaxoSmithKline); and Ventolin®
(albuterol), authorized by GlaxoSmithKline and sold by Dey LP.43
Many brand-name firms did not continue to sell authorized generics at that time,
however, reportedly due to a lack of profitability.44  One reason for the “resurgence”
of authorized generics in the early 2000's is that physicians, pharmacists and patients
more rapidly switch to generic drugs upon their introduction to the marketplace than
a decade ago.45  Because the rate of generic adoption is much greater now, brand-
name firms  reportedly are more willing to “genericize” their own brands in order to
capture a share of that market.46  The expanding generic adoption rate has also
reportedly led to an industry trend where brand-name houses acquire generic firms.47
This development too may encourage authorized generics practice in the future.
In line with current trends, a number of successful paragraph IV ANDA
applicants have faced competition from authorized generics during the 180-day
generic exclusivity period.  These independent generic firms include Barr, for the
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product Allegra® (fexofenadine);48 Eon, for the product Wellbutrin SR® (bupropion
SR);49 and Teva, for the product Glucophage®.50  Some industry analysts believe that
authorized generics will form an increasingly prominent feature of the U.S.
pharmaceutical market in the future.51  Other commentators believe that this time has
already arrived:  According to one account, since 2004 “authorized generic versions
have appeared for nearly all drugs with expiring U.S. patents.”52
Authorized Generics within the Hatch-Waxman Framework
Authorized generics practice has proven controversial due to the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s architecture and incentive structures.  Some commentators have
voiced concerns that the introduction of authorized generics, particularly during the
180-day market exclusivity granted to the independent generic firm that brought a
paragraph IV challenge, thwarts the policy goal of encouraging the introduction of
generic pharmaceuticals.53  In particular, critics argue that the use of authorized
generics may discourage firms from filing paragraph IV patent challenges if their
litigation expenses cannot be recouped through the 180-day market exclusivity
period.54  As antitrust attorney David A. Balto explains:
The bounty from challenging a patent is very important.  Pharmaceutical patent
litigation is a multimillion-dollar proposition.  But for the potential reward of six-
month exclusivity that represents the vast majority of potential profits from
generic entry, many firms might forgo challenging patents.55
For example, the FDA ruled that the generic manufacturer Apotex was entitled
to 180-day exclusivity for its version of the anti-depressant drug Paxil® in 2003.  The
brand-name drug company, GlaxoSmithKline, introduced an authorized generic
version of Paxil®.  Although Apotex anticipated sales of up to $575 million during
the 180-day generic exclusivity period, its sales were reported to be between $150
million and $200 million.56  In a 2004 filing with the FDA, attorneys for Apotex
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asserted “that the authorized generic crippled Apotex’s 180-day exclusivity – it
reduced Apotex’s entitlement to about two-thirds – to the tune of approximately $400
million.”57
In addition, brand-name firms commonly introduce authorized generics on the
eve of generic competition.  Without an independent generic patent challenger in the
first instance, brand-name firms may themselves make diminished, or delayed, use
of the authorized generic strategy.  As a result, the pro-competitive benefits of
authorized generics may be postponed, or not realized at all, should independent
generic rivals become less willing to challenge patents held by brand-name firms.58
On the other hand, authorized generics potentially offer several benefits both to
drug companies and to consumers.  Authorized generics are commonly less
expensive than the brand-name drug.  The introduction of an authorized generic
therefore allows a lower-cost product to be made available to the consumer.59 As the
FDA opined in a statement issued in July 2004:
Marketing of authorized generics increases competition, promoting lower prices
for pharmaceuticals, particularly during the 180-day exclusivity period in which
the prices for generic drugs are often substantially higher than after other generic
products are able to enter the market.60
In addition, once a generic version of a drug becomes available following patent
expiration, brand-name firms may lose considerable market share.  Indeed, many
health management organizations and insurance companies reportedly promote the
use of generic substitutes for brand-name medications once they become available.61
Absent participation in the generic market, brand-name firms may not be able to take
advantage of investments they previously made with respect to their manufacturing
facilities.  Authorized generics therefore allow brand-name firms to continue to
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employ their manufacturing facilities at or near peak capacity even following patent
expiration.62
Authorized generics may also support the research and development efforts of
brand-name firms by providing them with additional revenue.  Authorized generics
may supply the brand-name firm with an additional income source, such as a royalty
on sales made by its generic subsidiary or contracting partner.63  These funds, or
some portion of them, can potentially be employed in support of pharmaceutical
innovation.
Authorized generics may also facilitate settlement of patent infringement suits
between brand-name and independent generic firms.  A judicial holding of patent
invalidity may have a severe impact upon a brand-name firm in terms of its lost
revenue.  Many observers also believe that patent litigation is an uncertain venture.64
By settling patent litigation, and allowing an ANDA applicant to produce an
authorized generic, brand-name firms may potentially better manage risk.  Such a
technique provides a more stable revenue stream, both in support of the brand-name
firm’s research and development activities and for its investors.  The generic
company making an authorized generic can also benefit by not having to expend
funds on litigation with an uncertain outcome or pursue an ANDA at the FDA, while
expanding its product line, acquiring manufacturing experience, and gaining the first-
mover advantage in the generic market.65
The use of authorized generics as a litigation settlement mechanism also impacts
consumers, but in a manner that is both less certain and likely varies on a case-by-
case basis.  On one hand, particular settlement agreements may provide for the sale
of authorized generics years before the disputed patent is set to expire.  As a result,
consumers may gain early access to a lower-cost alternative to the brand-name drug.
On the other hand, had the generic firm refused to settle and ultimately prevailed in
the litigation, then the market would have been open to full competition even earlier.
The impact upon competition of a litigation settlement likely depends upon a number
of complex factors, including the strength of the patent, the number of potential
generic competitors, and the precise terms of the litigation settlement agreement.
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Legality of Authorized Generics
The policy debate concerning authorized generics has been accompanied by
legal challenges before the FDA and the courts concerning this practice.  Opponents
of authorized generics have contended that the Hatch-Waxman Act’s generic
exclusivity provisions should be understood as excluding authorized generics from
the marketplace for the 180-day period.66  The FDA has taken the opposite view,
however, reasoning that the Hatch-Waxman Act does not require a brand-name
pharmaceutical company to file any sort of application in order to market the drug as
an authorized generic.67  In turn, the 180-day period of generic exclusivity provided
by the Hatch-Waxman Act only applies to ANDA or § 505(b)(2) applications with
paragraph IV certifications.  As a result, the 180-day generic exclusivity period does
not bar authorized generics from entering the market. 
Two notable judicial opinions have recently upheld the FDA’s position favoring
authorized generics.  In the first of these opinions, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries,
Ltd. v. Crawford,68 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found no reasonable
reading of the Hatch-Waxman Act that would allow authorized generics to be barred
by the 180-day generic exclusivity period.  In that case, independent generic
manufacturer Teva had previously entered into an arrangement with Purepac
Pharmaceutical Co., the first paragraph IV ANDA applicant with respect to the drug
gabapentin.  Teva and Purepac had agreed to share the 180-day generic exclusivity
period.  During that period, however, Pfizer sold its own authorized generic version
of gabapentin, which was priced substantially below the price of its brand-name
drug.69
Teva responded by petitioning the FDA to prohibit the marketing of authorized
generic versions of gabapentin during the 180-day generic exclusivity period.
Alternatively, Teva asserted that Pfizer should be required to file a supplemental
NDA (sNDA) before selling an authorized generic.70  According to Teva, the impact
of the latter proposed ruling would lead to the same outcome as the first: Pfizer
would be compelled to respect the 180-day generic exclusivity period established by
the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The FDA denied the petition, resulting in a Teva lawsuit against the FDA.  The
district court confirmed the FDA’s views, concluding that “[n]othing in the statute
provides any support for the argument that the FDA can prohibit NDA holders from
entering the market with [an authorized] generic drug during the exclusivity
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period.”71  Teva then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which
affirmed.
Chief Judge Ginsburg began his opinion by observing that the Hatch-Waxman
Act did not stipulate the manner in which the holder of an approved NDA must
market its drug.  Further, prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, nothing
in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prevented the NDA holder from marketing an
authorized generic.  The D.C. Circuit thus saw the issue as whether it should “declare
that a previously lawful practice became unlawful when the Congress passed a statute
that said nothing about that practice.”72 
The Court of Appeals further rejected Teva’s “functional” interpretation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.  According to Teva, the practice of authorized generics had
“developed only recently as a routine brand-name business strategy” and therefore
had not been anticipated by Congress.  Further, authorized generics practice severely
diminished generic incentives to challenge pharmaceutical patents.  According to
Teva, then, “adhering to the ‘literal’ terms of the statute would lead to an absurd
result, namely, that [the Hatch-Waxman Act] grants only a ‘meaningless’ exclusivity
against subsequent ANDA filers rather than a ‘commercially effective’ exclusivity
that runs against the NDA holder as well.”73
The D.C. Circuit responded by reasoning that the balance between innovation
and competition struck by the Hatch-Waxman Act was “quintessentially a matter for
legislative judgment,” such that “the court must attend closely to the terms in which
the Congress expressed that judgment.”74  Here, Chief Judge Ginsburg reasoned, the
statute was unambiguous.  Although the Hatch-Waxman Act barred the approval of
subsequent ANDAs for 180 days, the statutory language simply did not speak to
marketing arrangements made by the holder of the approved NDA.  The court of
appeals further observed that, even in the event that an NDA holder authorized a
generic, the 180-day exclusivity period continued to bar other firms from marketing
a generic version of the drug.  As a result, authorized generic practice hardly rendered
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s generic exclusivity provisions “meaningless.”75  In
conclusion, because the Hatch-Waxman Act “clearly does not prohibit the holder of
an approved NDA from marketing, during the 180-day exclusivity period, its own
‘brand-generic’ version of its drug,” FDA practices concerning authorized generics
were affirmed.76
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A second judicial opinion, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug
Administration,77 also concluded that the Hatch-Waxman Act “does not grant the
FDA the power to prohibit the marketing of authorized generics during the 180-day
exclusivity period ....”78  That case involved the pharmaceutical nitrofurantoin, which
is used to treat urinary tract infections.  When the FDA approved a paragraph IV
ANDA filed by Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc, to sell nitrofurantoin, NDA holder
Proctor & Gamble Pharmaceuticals, Inc., licensed a third party generic firm to sell
an authorized generic version of the drug.  Mylan reportedly lost sales of “tens of
millions” of dollars due to this arrangement.79
Mylan challenged the FDA approval of authorized generics practice before the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.  Mylan appealed the
district court’s dismissal of its case to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which affirmed.  Citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Teva v. Crawford with
approval, the Fourth Circuit similarly concluded that the statute clearly defined the
180-day exclusivity period only with respect to other paragraph IV ANDAs, not to
authorized generics.80  The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that “[a]lthough the
introduction of an authorized generic may reduce the economic benefit of the 180
days of exclusivity awarded to the first paragraph IV ANDA applicant, §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) gives no legal basis for the FDA to prohibit the encroachment of
authorized generics on that exclusivity.”81  As a result, the district court’s judgment
was affirmed.
It is possible to criticize the statutory construction of both Teva v. Crawford and
Mylan v. FDA.  In particular, neither court of appeals stressed that the Hatch-
Waxman Act describes the 180-day time frame as an “exclusivity period.”82  The
term “exclusivity” might be viewed as a curious drafting choice in view of the ruling
that generic firms must potentially compete alongside authorized generics during the
180-day period.
On the other hand, the notion of “shared exclusivity” that arose following the
Medicare Modernization Act amendments may be viewed as codifying congressional
intent that multiple generic applicants may enter the market during the 180-day
marketing exclusivity period.83  In addition, many prescription drugs are available in
a number of different dosage forms and strengths.  Under current Hatch-Waxman Act
practice, each strength and dosage form is considered a separate drug product for
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which a distinct generic applicant can qualify for 180-day exclusivity.84  As a result,
the term “exclusivity” may be considered to have a particular meaning in the Hatch-
Waxman Act – one that does not necessarily mean that independent generic firms
will not face competition during the 180-day period even in the absence of authorized
generics.  Of course, these provisions may also impact the incentives that
independent generic firms possess to challenge pharmaceutical patents.
In any event, Teva v. Crawford and Mylan v. FDA currently represent the law
of the land.  Absent further judicial developments or congressional activity,
authorized generics will be judged as legitimate means for NDA holders to market
their products under the Hatch-Waxman Act.85
The Forthcoming FTC Report
The Federal Trade Commission has become increasingly interested in
authorized generics practice.  Initially, the agency reportedly took the view “that
authorized generic agreements are pro-consumer because they allow multiple generic
entrants sooner.”86  Over the past several years, the FTC has either agreed to or has
declined to challenge such arrangements.87
More recently, the FTC has expressed concerns about authorized generics
practice.  Jon Leibowitz, one of five FTC Commissioners, reportedly stated that “the
introduction of an authorized generic will likely diminish incentives for generic firms
to challenge patents and incur substantial development and litigation costs.”88
Although the commissioner was said to be skeptical that authorized generics practice
violated the antitrust laws, he reportedly stated that he was “persuaded that
authorized generics may have competitive implications that could upset the Waxman-
Hatch balance.”89
The FTC is currently considering the authorized generics issue at greater length.
In response to a written request by three U.S. Senators, the FTC agreed to study “how
competition between Paragraph IV generics and authorized generics during the 180-
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day exclusivity period has affected short-run price competition and long-run
prospects for entry by Paragraph IV generics.”90  The FTC will also address the
impact of generic drug entry on the price of pharmaceuticals.91  The report is
expected to be released during the 2007 calendar year.
Issues in Innovation, Competition and Public Health
Because authorized generics are a relatively recent phenomenon, economic and
scholarly evaluation of their effect upon innovation, competition and public health
has been relatively limited.  Even the handful of academic commentary reveals
differences of views over their significance.  This report next reviews two leading
working papers that reached different conclusions about the impact of authorized
generics practice upon social welfare.92
Authorized Generics and Consumer Welfare
One recent working paper, Authorized Generic Drugs, Price Competition and
Consumers’ Welfare, was authored by Ernst R. Berndt, a member of the faculty of
the MIT Sloan School of Management, and several individuals associated with the
private firm Analysis Group, Inc.93  The Berndt study concluded that “on balance
authorized generics are unlikely to harm competition and can indeed benefit
consumers.”94  The authors initially observed that authorized generics may potentially
improve consumer welfare in several respects.  In particular, by introducing price
competition, the authorized generic could reduce the average price of the drug and
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result in greater marketplace penetration.95  Because an authorized generic is identical
to the brand-name drug, consumers who are loyal to the brand-name drug may also
be encouraged to switch to the lower-cost authorized generic alternative.96
According to the Berndt study, because numerous factors determine the
profitability of generic drugs, the additional variable of authorized generics should
not substantially impact the decision of an independent generic firm to file a
paragraph IV ANDA.  These factors include the possibilities that the independent
generic firm was not the first paragraph IV applicant, that the FDA may not approve
its ANDA, and that other independent generic firms may sell the identical drug at a
different dosage level during the 180-day exclusivity period.97  Because independent
generic firms have traditionally filed paragraph IV ANDAs despite these risks, the
authors reason that “it is not clear that one additional factor, authorized generic entry,
is sufficient to discourage many patent challenges.”98  The report further observed
that, even with the entry of an authorized generic into the relevant market, the
expected profits may still suffice to induce patent challenges.99
The Berndt study additionally reported empirical findings that, although the
180-day exclusivity period significantly increased short-run generic-to-brand price
ratios, it had scant impact upon long-run generic-to-brand price ratios.  Stated
differently, once multiple generic products enter the market, the historical existence
of an earlier 180-day generic exclusivity period had little effect upon drug pricing.
The authors conclude that “high generic penetration and low generic-to-brand price
ratios are achieved in the long run regardless of whether successful paragraph IV
certifications occurred.”100
The Berndt study further addressed the concern that authorized generics may
potentially delay generic entry.  According to the authors:
It has been argued that authorized generics will deter paragraph IV certifications
and potentially delay generic entry.  Most drugs, however, do not face a
paragraph IV certification (historically only about 20 percent have).  If the
anticipation of authorized generic entry decreases incentives for paragraph IV
certifications for the drugs that do face paragraph IV certification, it will do so
in those cases with the least likelihood of success.  As a result, generic entry will
not be delayed for most drugs (if any).101
To elaborate on this latter point, the report reasoned that authorized generics may
also lead to the salutary effect of reducing wasteful litigation.  According to the
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authors, independent generics have prevailed in Hatch-Waxman Act litigation 42
percent of the time.  As a result, the “paragraph IV certifications that may be deterred
by the prospect of authorized generic entry would most likely have a lower likelihood
of success than average.”102  Because such litigation is less likely to lead to improved
consumer access to independent generic drugs, any potential discouragement of this
litigation due to authorized generics practice is unlikely to impact competition and
public health, the Berndt study explained.
Some of the contentions of the Bernt study may be subject to criticism.  First,
while it is true that the percentage of ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications is
relatively low, that set of challenged patents are most likely the ones with sufficient
sales to attract generic interest.103  In turn, the challenged patents are likely to have
a disproportionate impact upon public health.  Second, although experience with
authorized generics has thus far been limited, some commentators believe that this
practice is growing.104  If so, the marketplace presence of authorized generics may not
amount merely to one risk among many, but rather a certainty.
Finally, although a successful patent challenge may not have much impact upon
drug prices years after the patent was scheduled to expire anyway, such a challenge
ordinarily allows generic competition to take place earlier than had the patent not
been invalidated.105  The judicial holding that a pharmaceutical patent is invalid has
significant short- and medium-term consequences, including lower consumer
expenditures on that medication but also the innovator’s diminished ability to recoup
research and development costs.  Achieving the socially optimal balance between
innovation and competition ultimately remains a difficult policy question that
authorized generics practice renders even more complex.
Authorized Generics and Patent Challenges
A second recent working paper, “Branded Generics” As a Strategy to Limit
Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets,106 was less sanguine about the
marketplace impact of authorized generics practice than the Berndt study.  As the
authors, David Reiffin of the U.S. Commodity Future Trading Commission and
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Michael R. Ward, a member of the economics faculty of the University of Texas at
Arlington, concluded:
Under current [FDA] regulations, the branded firm is not prohibited from
producing [an authorized] generic drug during the exclusivity period.  As in the
analysis above, the introduction of a branded generic drug will reduce the
successful litigant’s profits significantly, creating a duopoly, rather than a
monopoly during the 180 day period.  Thus, branded generic entry in Paragraph
IV cases can dramatically change the incentives of generic firms, perhaps
eliminating the incentive to litigate the validity of patents in some cases.107
In reaching this conclusion, Reiffin and Ward explained that relatively few
authorized generics had been introduced in the United States.  Because the decision
of an independent generic firm to submit a paragraph IV ANDA occurs prior to
patent expiration, the authors asserted that “it seems reasonable to assume that the
branded firm’s action in the instances in which it took place was not anticipated by
independent generic producers at the time they began the ANDA process.”108  Their
report therefore develops an economic model representing “a stylized version of
[pharmaceutical] industry characteristics and economic intuition.”109
Although the Reiffin and Ward model is complex, its analysis is founded upon
the notion that earlier entry by a firm into a generic market implies greater economic
rents for that firm.110  Generic firms essentially compete to obtain the largest rents by
being the first market entrant, followed by diminished rewards for achieving “second
place,” further diminished rewards for “third place,” and so on as additional firms
commence sales.  The authors’ analysis reveals several salient points about
authorized generics practice.  Under their model, the anticipated entry of authorized
generics should “crowd out” more than one independent generic firm.111  Second, the
“primary effect of branded generic strategy is to transfer rents from the consumer to
the patent holder.”112  Finally, the effect of authorized generics upon generic drug
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prices is, according to Reiffin and Ward, less significant for larger markets than
smaller ones.113
Some of the reasoning of the Reiffin and Ward study also is not immune to
criticism.  The authors are undoubtedly correct that past experience with authorized
generics may not suggest the future impact of this practice, given the reported
“resurgence” of authorized generic introductions in recent years.114  Nonetheless, at
least with respect to some medications, there has been no shortage of firms willing
to compete in generic markets despite knowledge of potential competition.  For
example, on June 9, 2004, the FDA authorized fourteen firms to market Bayer’s
Cipro® (cirprofoxacin).115  Similarly, on July 29, 2004, thirteen firms received FDA
approval to market generic versions of Pfizer’s Diflucan® (fluconazole).116  Due to
the possibility of “shared exclusivity” following enactment of the Medicare
Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003,117 the likelihood of multiple generic
market entrants during the 180-day statutory period has in fact increased.  Future
experience will undoubtedly enrich economic understanding of the costs and benefits
of authorized generic practice.
Concluding Observations
Although Congress made significant amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act as
recently as 2003,118  authorized generics were not subject to discussion at that time.
The rise of this practice, as well as the vigor of the debate surrounding it, suggests
both the pace of change within the industry and the prominence of the pharmaceutical
industry within the national public health system.
As discussion of authorized generics continues, Congress may wish to have a
sense of its legislative options.  Should Congress conclude that authorized generics
are appropriate, then it may simply take no action.  The opinions of the D.C. and
Fourth Circuits suggest that, as currently drafted, the Hatch-Waxman Act does not
allow the FDA to restrict the ability of brand-name firms to sell or approve of
authorized generics.119  Absent legislative input, the FDA may be unlikely to alter its
interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act in this respect in the future.
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If Congress instead believes that authorized generics practice may instead
disrupt the “bounty” system established by the Hatch-Waxman Act, one option is to
require brand-name firms to file a supplemental NDA,  or a similar application, with
the FDA.120  This filing would then place the brand-name firm in the same category
as generic applicants who did not qualify as the first to file.  In turn, the 180-day
generic exclusivity period would then apply to the authorized generic.  Alternatively,
Congress could simply disallow authorized generics practice, at least during the 180-
day generic exclusivity period.
Notably, whether the 180-day generic exclusivity period strikes an appropriate
balance between encouraging patent challenges and ensuring prompt access to
generic medications is itself a contested proposition within the pharmaceutical
industry.121  Discussion of the authorized generics issue may also prompt further
reflection on the basic structure of incentives within the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Current interest in authorized generics reflects longstanding congressional
concern for the appropriate balance between innovation and competition within the
pharmaceutical industry.  Although academic inquiry into authorized generics
practice remains in its early phases, it is notable that knowledgeable commentators
have reached disparate views of the benefits or detriments of this practice.  Some
observers stress that authorized generics benefit consumers by providing enhanced
access to lower-cost alternatives to branded drugs, while others express concerns that
authorized generics will defeat the incentives that independent generic firms possess
to challenge pharmaceutical patents.  The analysis to be provided in the forthcoming
FTC report and other studies may shed additional light on the impact of authorized
generics upon consumer welfare.122
